Chinese Companies Need Vigilant Audit

Some of my readers have shown their interest to the assurance services in BRIC in the comments to the last post. And guess what? The recent issue of The Economist contains the article “Accounting in China”, which reflects my concerns about audit of companies from BRIC in general (see link). The beginning of the article is quite appealing:

“CAN you trust Chinese accounts? Many investors fear (and several short-sellers are betting) that the answer is “no”. Sino-Forest, a big forestry firm listed in Toronto, is a case in point. Last year Muddy Waters, a short-seller, accused it of running a Ponzi scheme, which it denies. On January 31st Sino-Forest released the final report of independent investigators into the charge. Insiders crow that the gumshoes found no smoking gun. The gumshoes grumbled that, lacking access to all the evidence, they were “not able to reach definitive conclusions”.

America’s SEC is trying to force the Shanghai office of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, a big Western accountancy firm, to hand over papers related to Longtop, a Chinese software firm that was delisted by the New York Stock Exchange last year. Deloitte refuses, saying this would violate Chinese laws on “state secrets”. Deloitte may have a point. If it co-operates, its local staff could be jailed under Chinese law.”

So, this is the question, which had to be raised sooner or later: can be the companies transparent while operating in the conditions of non-transparent political system? There are no big traditions of Chinese government accountability to citizens of China. The market incentives to provide true and fair financial statements are seem to be not enough.

How to deal with this issue?

China need not take all the blame for the failure to provide true financial statements. The problem is common for all emerging markets. It could be said that the reason for that is not necessarily deliberate misrepresentation. Errors might happen due to lack of knowledge, the absence of open communication tradition.

According to the article in The Economist one of the Big4 bosses acknowledged the issue and insisted that “the Big Four have greatly increased their vigilance in China”. To generalize this comment one can state an implicit rule for the audit of financial statements in emerging markets: the financial statement risk for all companies originated from emerging markets should be assessed as "high" at the beginning of audit unless otherwise could be proven. The proof of lower risk assessment could be obtained after one or two years of audit, which would provide evidence about low susceptibility of systems to errors and effective control system.

I agree that this proposal could be viewed as a strict and reactionary one, but I stated it to initiate discussion of what could be done regarding accounts provided by BRIC and other emerging markets. I expect you to share your valuable ideas in the comments, and we might discuss them.

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The Role of Big4 in promoting IFRS

The audit of IFRS reports is one of the major services provided by the international accounting networks. This is because they possess necessary knowledge and skills, which could be used all over the world. However, there are negative moments in this process, which could be illustrated by conclusion made by Sucher and Alexander (2002) in their research:

     “Given their power over both the production and audit of IAS accounts, the Big Five firms play a very large role in interpreting and implementing IAS standards in a particular country.  This raises issues of power and responsibility with respect to compliance with IAS that need to be addressed clearly by the IASB”

So this post is going to address this issue and point out on existing problem especially in emerging markets.

Illustrations

The issue was substantially researched by Sucher and Alexander (2002) based on the example of Russia and by Sucher and Jindrichovska (2004) in study of situation in Czech Republic.

The problem is that companies in emerging economies suffer from lack of knowledge and expertise in preparation of IFRS accounts. The probable solution could be to hire IFRS specialist or to outsource reporting process. But on the one hand there is a shortage of qualified and experienced professionals in emerging markets. On the other hand, outsourcing by one and afterwards auditing by another independent firm are seen as superfluous costs. Finally, these companies opt into simple solution – they ask audit firms both to prepare and audit their IFRS accounts. This state of things as honourable auditors we can’t tolerate, can we?

Sucher and Alexander (2002) illustrated the situation by remark of one of Big Five (at the moment of research) interviewees:

“As you know we do not prepare accounts for our clients – it is an independence issue….however, we do provide a degree of assistance….. Some accountants in enterprises crunch the numbers (for IAS) and others say, ‘look guys we pay you to do it.  It is a fairy tale’”

It is not only willingness to save money, the issue is also related with the perception of an audit as no-value-adding activity. Interviewees in Czech Republic complained that the earlier Big 4 audit firm provided such package of services while the latest Big 4 auditors refuse to do this (Sucher and Jindrichovska 2004). One of the Big 4 auditors (interviewee) added fuel to the fire:

“Some financial managers and accountants [in enterprises] do not know what is going on [with IFRS]. They are only the passive receivers. In [X audit firm], there are templates that transform Czech accounting to IAS. The knowledge is kept in the audit company. It is big business [for the audit firm]. You can train companies to do the supporting sheets hut the final bit is done by the audit firm.”(Sucher and Jindrichovska 2004).

Meanwhile, management of the companies would always be keen on saving costs on such things like audit. It is quite likely that such kind of cosy relations are more beneficial to audit firms. At least they could have separated audit and accounting team, but according to research it would be too costly for audit firms and they end up by assigning one team of people to do both jobs, which is a shame.

Problems

The basic issue which arises here is how far should we trust financial statements prepared in emerging markets? To what extent this practice spread in other emerging countries, where corporate governance and law enforcement are not developed enough? I think that it is highly probable that similar “reporting-auditng” is practiced in China, where local management is rather pushy in accounting issues (see Deloitte’s case).

The other question how can we deal with the issue in sensible way. For example, one is audit manager and one is doing audit of IFRS reports of Brazilian company. The resourceful Brazilian finance director provides auditor with financial statements (FS) essentially based on Brazilian GAAP, but with name of IFRS on its face. The trick is that you will do honest auditing, spot discrepancies from real IFRS and provide list of adjustments which need to be done J It is foxy tactic, isn’t it?

What do you think about truthfulness of IFRS accounts of companies from emerging markets listed on global stock exchanges? Have you faced approach mentioned above in your reporting or auditing practice? How to discourage auditors from doing that especially in the context of coming “pure-audit-firms” legislation? Please share your knowledge and experience.

References

Sucher, P. and Alexander, D. (2002) IAS: Issues of Country, Sector and Audit Firm Compliance in Emerging Economies (London: Centre for Business Performance of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales).

Sucher P., and Jindrichovska I. (2004) Implementing IFRS: A Case Study of the Czech Republic. EAA, Accounting in Europe, Vol. 1, pp. 109-141.