Showing posts with label corporate governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label corporate governance. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 10, 2015

Audit Firm: Governance Code

The market for large audits in the UK is dominated by four firms and the risk of the withdrawal of a major firm is a matter of continuing concern to the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and many others. In January 2010 the FRC and Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) published the Audit Firm Governance Code.

It is applicable to those firms that audit more than 20 listed companies and it is applicable from financial years beginning on or after 1 June 2010. The Code currently applies to seven audit firms that together audit about 95% of the companies listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. For these firms, the code sets a benchmark for good governance which other audit firms may wish to voluntarily adopt in full or in part. It also codifies much existing good practice and links to matters that audit firms must comply with as regulated professional partnerships.
The seven firms to which the code currently applies are:
  • Baker Tilly LLP
  • BDO LLP
  • Deloitte LLP
  • Ernst & Young LLP
  • Grant Thornton LLP
  • KPMG LLP
  • PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

The Code is designed to play four major roles:
  • enhance the stature of firms as highly visible exemplars of best practice governance;
  • enrich firms’ transparency reports;
  • encourage changes in governance which improve the way that firms are run; and
  • strengthen the regulatory regime by achieving transparent and effective governance without disproportionate regulation.

The FRC monitors the extent to which these firms comply with the Code. Regular reviews are conducted by FRC to check compliance by firms with all the provisions of the code.

Additional Thoughts

High quality corporate governance is mandatory to foster investment in the economy. Audit firms play the role of watchdogs in the economy and it is essential for them to implement sound governance practices within their own organizations. The Code in this regard will help the audit firms by more sharply defining the public interest, particularly by explicitly recognizing the importance of audit quality.

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

The Role of Big4 in promoting IFRS


The audit of IFRS reports is one of the major services provided by the international accounting networks. This is because they possess necessary knowledge and skills, which could be used all over the world. However, there are negative moments in this process, which could be illustrated by conclusion made by Sucher and Alexander (2002) in their research:
     “Given their power over both the production and audit of IAS accounts, the Big Five firms play a very large role in interpreting and implementing IAS standards in a particular country.  This raises issues of power and responsibility with respect to compliance with IAS that need to be addressed clearly by the IASB”
So this post is going to address this issue and point out on existing problem especially in emerging markets.

Illustrations
The issue was substantially researched by Sucher and Alexander (2002) based on the example of Russia and by Sucher and Jindrichovska (2004) in study of situation in Czech Republic.
The problem is that companies in emerging economies suffer from lack of knowledge and expertise in preparation of IFRS accounts. The probable solution could be to hire IFRS specialist or to outsource reporting process. But on the one hand there is a shortage of qualified and experienced professionals in emerging markets. On the other hand, outsourcing by one and afterwards auditing by another independent firm are seen as superfluous costs. Finally, these companies opt into simple solution – they ask audit firms both to prepare and audit their IFRS accounts. This state of things as honourable auditors we can’t tolerate, can we?
Sucher and Alexander (2002) illustrated the situation by remark of one of Big Five (at the moment of research) interviewees:
“As you know we do not prepare accounts for our clients – it is an independence issue….however, we do provide a degree of assistance….. Some accountants in enterprises crunch the numbers (for IAS) and others say, ‘look guys we pay you to do it.  It is a fairy tale’
It is not only willingness to save money, the issue is also related with the perception of an audit as no-value-adding activity. Interviewees in Czech Republic complained that the earlier Big 4 audit firm provided such package of services while the latest Big 4 auditors refuse to do this (Sucher and Jindrichovska 2004). One of the Big 4 auditors (interviewee) added fuel to the fire:
“Some financial managers and accountants [in enterprises] do not know what is going on [with IFRS]. They are only the passive receivers. In [X audit firm], there are templates that transform Czech accounting to IAS. The knowledge is kept in the audit company. It is big business [for the audit firm]. You can train companies to do the supporting sheets hut the final bit is done by the audit firm.”(Sucher and Jindrichovska 2004).
Meanwhile, management of the companies would always be keen on saving costs on such things like audit. It is quite likely that such kind of cosy relations are more beneficial to audit firms. At least they could have separated audit and accounting team, but according to research it would be too costly for audit firms and they end up by assigning one team of people to do both jobs, which is a shame.

Problems
The basic issue which arises here is how far should we trust financial statements prepared in emerging markets? To what extent this practice spread in other emerging countries, where corporate governance and law enforcement are not developed enough? I think that it is highly probable that similar “reporting-auditng” is practiced in China, where local management is rather pushy in accounting issues (see Deloitte’s case).
The other question how can we deal with the issue in sensible way. For example, one is audit manager and one is doing audit of IFRS reports of Brazilian company. The resourceful Brazilian finance director provides auditor with financial statements (FS) essentially based on Brazilian GAAP, but with name of IFRS on its face. The trick is that you will do honest auditing, spot discrepancies from real IFRS and provide list of adjustments which need to be done J It is foxy tactic, isn’t it?
What do you think about truthfulness of IFRS accounts of companies from emerging markets listed on global stock exchanges? Have you faced approach mentioned above in your reporting or auditing practice? How to discourage auditors from doing that especially in the context of coming “pure-audit-firms” legislation? Please share your knowledge and experience.

References
Sucher, P. and Alexander, D. (2002) IAS: Issues of Country, Sector and Audit Firm Compliance in Emerging Economies (London: Centre for Business Performance of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales).
Sucher P., and Jindrichovska I. (2004) Implementing IFRS: A Case Study of the Czech Republic. EAA, Accounting in Europe, Vol. 1, pp. 109-141.